Charles Notzon and Dan Wilson of the San Francisco Fed summarize "papers  presented at a conference on 'Recent Trends in Economic Volatility' (we may soon find out if the recent trend, i.e. The Great Moderation, was truly Great, or just a flash in the pan): 
  Recent Trends in Economic Volatility: Conference Summary,  by Charles Notzon and Dan Wilson,  FRBSF Economic Letter: Over the last  25 years, the U.S. economy has become much less volatile; that is, the swings  from boom to bust have been greatly reduced, as has the pain typically  associated with such cycles. As Figure 1 illustrates, the volatility of GDP  growth has fallen by more than half since 1985. Many observers refer to this  phenomenon as the "Great Moderation." To what can we credit this improved  environment? Researchers have uncovered several potential drivers, including  improved technology (especially related to inventory and supply chain  management), better monetary policy, and simple good luck, but to date they have  found little consensus on which factor is most important. 
   
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis.
 Also in dispute is the extent to which the decline in aggregate  volatility has been mirrored in the microeconomic data on income and employment.  In other words, have households and businesses also experienced a decline in  volatility? The seven papers presented at the Center for the Study of Innovation  and Productivity's conference on "Recent Trends in Economic Volatility"  investigate these questions. Although the debate is not over, the papers have  moved the research forward and highlighted key questions for future work.
                                                                                                                              
Structural change vs. good luck in explaining the Great Moderation
  
The first paper of the conference, by Galí and  Gambetti, begins with a useful summary of the various explanations for the Great  Moderation, placing them into two broad categories: structural changes and "good  luck." Structural changes include changes in the way monetary policy is  conducted and technology-driven changes that affect the way firms operate. "Good  luck" essentially means smaller and fewer economic shocks. Galí and Gambetti go  on to use a standard empirical model known as a structural vector autoregression  in order to characterize the correlations in post-World War II data among key  U.S. macroeconomic variables. They posit that if declining volatility is merely  the result of "good luck," then the data should show no change in the  correlations between them. Their model, however, finds that this is not the  case, as correlations between output, labor hours, and productivity have indeed  changed since the early 1980s. Having eliminated good luck as an explanation,  they attribute most of the decline in volatility to a decline in nontechnology  shocks, which have come about due to a change in the Federal Reserve's monetary  policy "rules" (specifically, an increased emphasis on fostering low and stable  inflation in addition to strong economic growth) as well as a reduction in labor  adjustment costs. It is worth noting that the authors' finding that reduced  labor adjustment costs may have played an important role in the Great Moderation  is consistent with evidence, discussed below, provided by the paper of Davis et  al., which explores the secular decline in labor market volatility. 
  
The role of technological change
  
Several papers ascribe a key role to technological progress in explaining  declining volatility. The first of these papers, by Koren and Tenreyro, looks at  how development of new technologies affects both the rate of growth and the  volatility of growth in an economy. Their model posits that, just as households  benefit from investing in a diversified portfolio of stocks (smoothing their  returns and minimizing losses stemming from shocks to specific assets), having a  larger and more diverse "menu" of technologies available to firms in a country  means that each specific technology plays less of a role in production. The  diversification of technologies in an economy makes it easier for firms to  offset price or supply shocks to specific inputs (oil, for example) by  substituting with other technologies that rely less on those inputs. In this  way, technological advances reduce firm-level volatility, which consequently  reduces overall volatility. Technological change also boosts the level of  growth, since it allows firms to move to a new technology before reaching the  point of diminishing returns in their old technology. While sensible and  consistent with data that Koren and Tenreyro bring to bear, this finding  contrasts sharply with the conclusions of previous research, which point to an  explicit tradeoff between risk (volatility) and return (fast growth).
  
Comin and Mulani also examine the effects of technological change on economic  growth and volatility and, similarly, find that technological change leads to  both faster growth and lower volatility. But in contrast to the previous paper,  Comin and Mulani argue that this good result holds only for the national, or  macro, measures. Indeed, predictions from their model suggest that firm-level,  or micro, volatility should increase as the pace of technological innovation  increases. To get this result, they consider an economy with two types of  technologies: general innovations (GIs), which are not patentable and are used  by all firms in the economy, and research and development innovations (RDI),  which are patentable and used by a limited number of firms. They then assume  that GIs are produced by large, stable firms and RDIs are produced by smaller,  more volatile firms. Under these conditions, they show that increases in RDIs  (for example, due to government research and development (R&D) subsidies) lead  to market "shake-up," whereby smaller firms gain market share and perhaps even  leapfrog ahead of the previous market leaders. Since GI activity relies on the  presence of stable market leaders, this shake-up creates both firm-level  volatility and lower GI activity. The decline in GIs, which by definition help  all firms, reduces the comovement between firms in the economy, ultimately  reducing the volatility of aggregate outcomes. Said more simply, if the increase  in the innovative activity comes from small firms jockeying for position in the  industry, aggregate volatility will go down, as winners and losers will offset  each other, but microvolatility will rise, as losing firms compete to get back  on top. Comin and Mulani provide empirical evidence showing that increased R&D  activity in the U.S. has coincided with increased volatility in sales and market  shares for publicly traded firms, reduced comovement across industries, and  reduced volatility in aggregate economic growth.
  
Turning to the purely micro data, Brynjolfsson et al. analyze the impact of  information technology (IT) on industry volatility or turbulence. Use of IT  allows an innovation to diffuse rapidly throughout a firm, increasing  productivity and market share faster than was previously possible. Although  first movers on an innovation are able to gain market share quickly creating the  opportunity for concentration, the speed of diffusion that IT affords also  enables new entrants to leapfrog ahead of leaders in a given sector, thus  increasing sectoral turnover rates (turbulence). Empirically, IT-intensive  industries have indeed experienced both greater concentration and turbulence.  This evidence is consistent with the findings of Comin and Mulani that firms in  more R&D-intensive industries tend to have more volatile sales and market  shares, since there is a strong correlation between an industry's R&D intensity  and its IT intensity.
  
Supply chain management
  
The role of supply chain management in the Great Moderation is the subject of  a paper by Davis and Kahn as well as one by Irvine and Schuh. Davis and Kahn  argue that dramatic technology-driven improvements in supply chain management in  the durable goods sector, combined with a secular shift away from domestic  durable goods manufacturing and toward services, is the explanation for the  decline in aggregate volatility. They suggest that changes in monetary policy,  on the other hand, played a minimal role. Their model of the firm's inventory  decision process mirrors observed declines in output and sales volatility, as  well as the sales-to-output ratio, and the authors suggest that a shorter lead  time for materials orders (more precise inventory control) is the key mechanism  through which this change has occurred. 
  
Irvine and Schuh also find that improvement in supply chain management likely  played the predominant role in reduced aggregate volatility. Using a  multi-sector, vector-autoregression empirical model, they find that a decline in  the comovement of output among inventory-holding industries (for example,  manufacturing and wholesale trade) can explain a substantial share of the  decline in aggregate output volatility. Their model suggests that a change in  structural relationships between inventory-holding industries seems to be the  cause of this decline, and industries in which firms share supply and  distribution chains exhibited the largest decline in covariance in volatility.  As in Davis and Kahn, Irvine and Schuh find little evidence that changes in  monetary policy or "good luck" are major factors behind the Great Moderation. 
  
Volatility in the labor market 
  
In the final paper of the conference, Davis et al.  establish and attempt to explain two interesting facts from the data. The first  fact is that volatility of employment levels within firms, particularly those  not publicly traded, has declined over the past 25 years. The second fact is  that the flows of individuals into unemployment have fallen over time. In the  early 1980s about 4% of employed persons fell into unemployment (either  voluntarily or involuntarily) in the average month; by the early 1990s, this  figure had dropped to just 2%. The focus of their paper, then, is to investigate  whether the decline in volatility in employment demand by businesses is  responsible for the decline in unemployment inflows. Using industry-level data,  they find a strong statistical association between an industry's volatility in  employment demand, as measured by the variance in its job destruction rate, and  the industry's unemployment inflow rate (the rate at which workers in the  industry go into unemployment in a given period). They conclude that the decline  in firm level employment volatility likely has reduced flows into unemployment.
  
Conclusion 
  
While there is broad agreement that aggregate economic  volatility has declined over the last 25 years, the relative roles of  economywide factors, such as changes in monetary policy and technological  change, remain topics of dispute. Also in dispute is the extent to which this  decline in aggregate volatility is mirrored in microeconomic variables, such as  income and employment. Reductions in aggregate and firm-level volatility do not  necessarily translate into a reduction in volatility at the individual level.  Rather, some studies argue that household consumption and individual earnings  have become more volatile in recent decades, not less. The linkages between the  disparate trends in volatility at the aggregate level and at the individual  level remain important areas of economic research.